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Recent surveys in the United States and the Muslim world show widespread misinformation
about the events of September 11, 2001. Using data from 9 predominantly Muslim countries,
we study how such beliefs depend on exposure to news media and levels of education. Standard
economic theory would predict that increased access to information should cause beliefs to
converge. More recent models of biased belief formation suggest that this result might hinge
critically on who is providing the information. Consistent with the latter, we ﬁnd that overall
intensity of media use and level of education have at best a weak correlation with beliefs, while
particular information sources have strong and divergent eﬀects. Compared to those with little
media exposure or schooling, individuals watching Arab news channels or educated in schools
with little Western inﬂuence are less likely to agree that the September 11 attacks were carried
out by Arab terrorists. Those exposed to media or education from Western sources are more
likely to agree. Belief that the attacks were morally justiﬁed and general attitudes toward the
US are also strongly correlated with source of information. These ﬁndings survive controls
for demographic characteristics and are robust to identifying media eﬀects using cross-country
variation in language.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
America has an image problem. Only 1 percent of people surveyed in June 2003 in Jordan or
the Palestinian Authority expressed a favorable opinion of the United States. Favorability ratings
elsewhere in the Middle East were almost all below 30 percent. Osama bin Laden was among the
top three leaders most often trusted to “do the right thing” by survey respondents in Indonesia,
Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and the Palestinian Authority (Pew Research Center, 2003). Responses
to similar questions by Americans reveal that the feeling is mutual: Only 24 percent of Americans
expressed favorable views of Muslim countries overall, and 58 percent said the number of immigrants
from these countries allowed into the US should be reduced (USA Today 2002).
One view is that this mutual antagonism stems from deep-rooted cultural and religious diﬀer-
ences. This thesis has been advanced most famously by Huntington (1993), and suggests that a
combination of conﬂicting interests and conﬂicting values makes conﬂict virtually inevitable.1 Sur-
vey responses reveal, however, that people in these two parts of the world do not just perceive their
interests to be opposed, or disagree about the moral or ethical meaning of the events that have
transpired. Rather, they have radically diﬀerent, and distorted, perceptions of the facts themselves.
The disagreement is revealed most starkly in questions about the September 11 attacks on the
World Trade Center. In survey results we report below, 78 percent of respondents in seven Muslim
countries said that they do not believe that a group of Arabs carried out the attacks. Likewise,
according to the Washington Post (2003), 69 percent of Americans believe it is “somewhat” or
“very” likely that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the attacks, despite the absence of
any evidence to that eﬀect.2
This picture bears a striking resemblance to a dynamic highlighted eighty years ago by Walter
Lippmann (1922):
[W]hen full allowance has been made for deliberate fraud, political science has still to
1Such a pessimistic outlook is reﬂected in public opinion in both the Islamic countries and the United States: in
both, roughly a quarter of people respond to the question of when a “better understanding” will be achieved between
t h et w os i d e sb ys a y i n g“ n e v e r ”( USA Today 2002).
2Another striking observation concerns the 2003 war in Iraq. In September, 2003, 20 percent of Americans said
that Iraq had used chemical or biological weapons against American troops, again clearly contradicting the available
evidence (Kull et al, 2003).
2account for such facts as two nations attacking one another, each convinced that it
is acting in self-defense... They live, we are likely to say, in diﬀerent worlds. More
accurately, they live in the same world, but they think and feel in diﬀerent ones.
The challenge Lippmann makes to political science applies equally well to modern economics.
A simple model based on standard theory would say that individuals in America and the Islamic
countries simply have diﬀerent information. Thus, any changes that decrease the cost of obtaining
information–in particular an expanded supply of news or increased education–should gradually
cause these misperceptions to disappear. Importantly, this should be true regardless of the biases
or viewpoints of the information sources.3 Compared to an inevitable “clash of civilizations,” this
picture is a sanguine one. It suggests that the natural process of economic development and media
expansion may eliminate much of the existing hostility.4
An array of evidence, however, calls into question the assumptions of this model, and suggests
that the outlook it implies may be overly optimistic. Glaeser (2003), for example, notes numerous
examples of beliefs that are sharply and persistently diﬀerent across countries. The conﬁrmatory
bias literature in psychology–most notably Lord, Ross and Lepper’s (1979) study of views on the
death penalty–shows that giving additional information to subjects with diﬀerent prior opinions
can lead to divergence rather than convergence of beliefs. Lippmann himself discusses a vast body
of anecdotal evidence pointing to the ease with which beliefs can be manipulated, as well as the
prevalence of bias in individuals’ assimilation of new information.
These observations point to a model in which persuasion is possible. In the model of Mul-
lainathan and Shleifer (2003), for example, individuals account imperfectly for bias introduced by
particular information sources. Control over the supply of information thus provides an opportunity
3In the short-run, of course, a particular information draw could cause an individual’s belief to deviate farther
from the truth. Similarly, if information sources are expected to be unbiased, introducing a biased source could
temporarily deceive people. But in expectation, it must be the case that decreasing the cost of information causes
b e l i e f st oc o n v e r g et ot h et r u t h .
4This optimistic view is echoed by policy makers. George Bush attributes negative attitudes like those cited above
to America’s failure to adequately convey “the compassionate side of the American story,” pointing to the example of
North Korean citizens who are kept unaware of the American food aid supplied to their country (State Department,
2002). Al Gore sees the roots of violence toward the West in “another axis of evil,” one of whose key elements is
“ignorance” (Martinovich, 2002). World Bank President James Wolfensohn highlights “education and knowledge
e x c h a n g e ”a sak e yt oﬁghting terrorism, and Nobel Peace Prize winner Elie Wiesel says: “The roots of terrorism nest
in... the will to live in ignorance... Education is the way to eliminate terrorism” (World Bank 2003; Jai, 2001).
3to manipulate beliefs. Other recent models that explicitly incorporate persuasion include Becker
(2001) and Glaeser (2002). In all of these settings, simply increasing the supply of information no
longer has clear eﬀects on beliefs. Rather, the incentives of those providing the information become
key.
In this paper, we investigate how beliefs and attitudes in the Muslim world depend on the
quantity and source of information. We use a unique survey dataset on over 10,000 respondents in
9 predominantly Muslim countries to explore the eﬀects of media and education on the accuracy of
beliefs and attitudes toward the West. Though we do not directly examine American beliefs and
attitudes, we cite evidence suggesting that the same patterns we see in the Muslim countries may
hold in the United States as well.
The ﬁrst question we address is how individuals’ overall quantity of media use and education
relate to the accuracy of their beliefs, and to their attitudes toward the West. Consistent with
a model in which persuasion is important, we ﬁnd that this relationship is very weak. Although
individuals with more exposure to the news media are more likely to be informed with respect
to politically neutral information, they are not signiﬁcantly more likely to have accurate beliefs
about the September 11 attacks. More educated individuals do tend to have more accurate beliefs
about the attacks, but the eﬀect is much smaller than for politically neutral information measures.
Neither overall media use nor education is consistently related to attitudes toward the US.
The second question is how beliefs and attitudes depend on the source of information. We ﬁnd
strong and consistent eﬀects that point to the importance of persuasion. Viewers of the Arabic-
language satellite station Al Jazeera, for example, are less likely to attribute the September 11
attacks to Arab terrorists than those who watch no media at all, and also more likely to express
anti-American sentiment. Viewers of CNN, on the other hand, have slightly more accurate beliefs
about the attacks and express more pro-US views. These results remain when we use linguistic
diﬀerences among countries as a source of exogenous variation in access to diﬀerent media sources.
Turning to education, we develop a proxy for the degree of western contact and inﬂuence in the
education system based on the percentage of university instruction oﬀered in English. We ﬁnd that
education correlates positively with both accurate beliefs about the attacks and pro-US views when
the English share is large, and has zero or negative correlation where the share is small.
4Given the complexity of the setting and the limitations of a single cross-sectional data set, it
is not possible to deﬁnitively separate the possible causal relationships among these variables, and
the ﬁndings should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, results from a range of diﬀerent
measures and speciﬁcations paint a surprisingly consistent picture that we believe sheds light on
the role of information in shaping attitudes and beliefs.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that increasing access to information in a broad sense will not
necessarily improve relations between the Muslim world and the West. In fact, if market forces
bring forth media sources that tend to reinforce existing biases (as in Mullainathan and Shleifer
2003) or promote the views of the respective governments, media growth could actually deepen
hostilities.5 On the other hand, policies speciﬁcally targeted at increasing the variety of viewpoints
available could have a positive eﬀect. From the US perspective, this would suggest that steps like
subsidizing the translation or subtitling of Western news sources in local languages could be an
eﬀective intervention.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the 2002 Gallup Poll of the
Islamic World. Section 2 presents our results on the news media, and section 3 presents ﬁndings
on education. Section 4 concludes.
2D a t a
Our data come from the 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World (The Gallup Organization, 2002).
The survey consists of 10,004 responses from nine predominantly Muslim countries: Pakistan
(2,043), Iran (1,501), Indonesia (1,050), Turkey (1,019), Lebanon (1,050), Morocco (1,000), Kuwait
(790), Jordan (797), and Saudi Arabia (754). Other than a slight oversampling of urban house-
holds, the samples are designed to be representative of the adult (18 and over) population in each
country.6
5A New York Times editorial speculates: “If a free, uncensored press ever arrives in the Arab world, many
Americans will be shocked by what it says. Then, the energetic... broadcasts of Al Jazeera will seem, in comparison,
like the nuanced objectivity of the BBC” (2003).
6Further details on sample selection and survey methodology are available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/summits/islam.asp.
5To construct each national sample, oﬃcial statistics were used to stratify locations by demo-
graphic characteristics. Primary sampling units (PSUs) were then selected from each stratum,
and households were selected in each PSU according to a pre-speciﬁed plan. Within a household,
respondents were chosen according to the Kish Grid system to prevent selection bias.
Interviews were conducted in person in the respondent’s home, and each 120-question interview
typically took about one hour to complete. The survey questions cover a number of areas, including
basic demographics, frequency of media use, media choice, personal and religious values, attitudes
toward the West, attitudes toward contemporary and historical ﬁgures, and attitudes toward par-
ticular countries. Appendix Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of the sample,
which is well dispersed across diﬀerent cohorts and socioeconomic groups.
Our measures of knowledge cover two types of information: politically neutral and politically
loaded. Our measure of politically neutral information is drawn from a question asking respondents’
knowledge and opinion of various world leaders: Koﬁ Annan, Mahatma Ghandi, Nelson Mandela,
Salahddine Al Ayyoubi, Tony Blair, George Bush, Amro Mousa, and Kamal Attaturk. Many of
these leaders are either strongly associated with the history of particular countries in our sample
(i.e. Ghandi for Pakistan and Attaturk for Turkey) or are strongly associated with the US (i.e.
Bush and Blair). To develop as neutral a measure as possible, we therefore focus on knowledge
of Koﬁ Annan: we code a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent expresses an opinion about
Koﬁ Annan and 0 if she indicates that she is “not aware of” him. All the results reported below
are qualitatively unchanged if we replace the Koﬁ Annan variable with the total number of leaders
of whom the respondent is aware.
Our measure of politically loaded information comes from the following question:
According to news reports groups of Arabs carried out attacks against USA [sic]o n
September 11th. Do you think that this is true or not?
We code a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent believes the news reports.7
7The share of respondents answering “yes” to this question correlates almost perfectly across countries with the
share of respondents indicating that Al Qaeda was behind the attacks in an open-ended question on the same topic.
This suggests that answers to this question can be interpreted as reﬂecting the extent of belief in news stories about
September 11.
6Our primary measure of attitudes toward anti-American terrorism comes from the following
question:
There are many acts some people may do in life. I will read out to you number of these
acts I would like you to indicate to which extent it can be morally justiﬁed?... Events of
September 11 in USA, that is, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Respondents report an answer from 1, cannot be justiﬁed at all, to 5, completely justiﬁable. For
ease of interpretation, we will generally code this question as a binary variable equal to 1 if the
respondent feels that the September 11 attacks cannot be justiﬁed at all, and 0 otherwise.8 This
question was not asked in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, so those countries will be omitted when our
statistical analysis uses this variable.
We will also make some use of a question about general attitudes toward the US:
In general, what opinion do you have of the following nations?...The United States.
Respondents answer from 1, very unfavorable, to 5, very favorable. We recode the response to
vary from 0 to 1.9 Though general opinions about the US are of less obvious policy relevance than
feelings about terrorism, this question was asked in all 9 countries, thus allowing us to make more
complete use of the available data.
Table 1 summarizes the variation in the attitude and information measures across the countries
in the sample. About 70 percent of respondents claim to be aware of Koﬁ Annan, and roughly
80 percent don’t believe that Arabs committed the September 11 attacks. Only about half of
respondents consider the September 11 attacks completely unjustiﬁable, and in Kuwait only about
one-fourth of the population feels that way.
8Given the range of beliefs in our sample about the facts surrounding the September 11 attacks, it is not entirely
obvious how responses about their moral justiﬁability should be interpreted. Saying the attacks are justiﬁable
correlates strongly with other measures of anti-US attitudes, however, consistent with the interpretation that most
respondents expressed their general opinion about terrorist attacks on the US.
9That is, we subtract 1 from the response code and divide the result by 4.
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3.1 Frequency of Media Use
One natural approach to measuring the eﬀects of information on attitudes is to exploit variation
in overall exposure to news media. Survey respondents were asked three questions of the form:
How frequently do you {read daily newspapers/watch TV/listen to the radio} these
days regardless of how much time you spent listening to the radio in an average day?
Possible responses were 7 days a week, 6 days a week, ..., 1 day a week, less often than one day a
week, or do not read/watch/listen. We have coded measures of media use to indicate the number
of days a week the medium is used, with “less often” coded as .5 and “do not use” coded as 0.
Table 2 shows the results of regressions of our key knowledge and attitude measures on these
three measures of media use frequency. Each cell presents the coeﬃcient and standard error from
a regression of the form:
Dependent variable = α + β (number of days a week read/watch/listen)+Xγ + ε
where X is a set of controls including country dummies and dummies for the demographic char-
acteristics described in Appendix Table 1. In columns (1), (2), and (3), the dependent variable is
binary, so the coeﬃcients represent marginal eﬀects from probit regressions of the probability that
the dependent variable is equal to 1 on the right-hand-side variables. In column (4), the coeﬃcients
reported are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.
So, for example, the coeﬃcient in the ﬁrst row of column (3) can be interpreted as the eﬀect of
reading a daily newspaper one more day per week on the probability that a respondent considers
the September 11 attacks unjustiﬁed, holding ﬁxed the respondent’s observable demographic char-
acteristics. The coeﬃcient indicates that reading the newspaper one more day per week increases
the probability of considering the attacks unjustiﬁed by .005.
The results in column (1) show that all three media types have large and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the likelihood of knowing who Koﬁ Annan is. For example, reading a daily newspaper
8one more day per week is associated with a 2.8 percent greater chance of knowing who Koﬁ Annan
is, and this eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the .1 percent level. This is consistent with our
expectations: respondents who make greater use of news media are better informed about world
events. This is true despite the fact that many of these countries have tight restrictions on media
ownership (Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova and Shleifer, 2003) that have only recently been eroded by
the rise of satellite television (Alterman, 1998).
In contrast, column (2) shows that the probability of believing US claims about September 11 is
only weakly increasing in the use of newspaper, television, and radio. The point estimates are small,
a n do n l yt h ee ﬀect of television is statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10 percent level). These striking
ﬁndings suggest that increased use of news media may not substantially reduce misinformation
about politically charged events.
Overall, the results in columns (3) and (4) suggest little or no eﬀect of media use on attitudes.
Within each attitude measure, eﬀects vary greatly in sign and magnitude. For example, newspaper
readership has a marginally statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the probability of thinking
the September 11 attacks unjustiﬁed, television viewership has a statistically insigniﬁcant positive
eﬀect, and listening to the radio has an insigniﬁcant negative eﬀect. None of the media use measures
has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in the same direction on both opinions about September 11 and
general attitudes toward the US.
Thus the evidence indicates that increased use of news media is associated with more politi-
cally neutral knowledge, but neither less misinformation nor more pro-US attitudes. The contrast
between politically neutral and politically loaded beliefs suggests the possibility that media “spin”
might make the source of information received just as important as its quantity. In the next
subsection, we investigate this issue using data on the choice of television news outlet.
3.2 Source of News
To study the role of the source of information in determining attitudes, we focus on two interna-
tional news networks popular in our sample countries: CNN International and Al Jazeera. CNN
International, a twenty-four-hour English-language news broadcast, is by far the most popular
9Western news network broadcasting in the countries in our sample. A subsidiary of AOL Time-
Warner, it claims to reach more than 10 million households and hotel rooms in the Middle East.
Programming in the region originates from London, and is almost entirely in English.10
Al Jazeera, a twenty-four-hour Arabic language network broadcasting out of Qatar, is the most
popular satellite news network in our sample countries, and claims to reach 35 million viewers
as of 2001.11 Broadcasting since 1996, Al Jazeera has been widely hailed for combining serious,
high-quality reporting with a willingness to present alternative viewpoints on contentious issues.12
It is, for example, one of the only Arab stations to have aired interviews with Israeli oﬃcials. With
most of its senior staﬀ having lived or been educated in the West (Alterman 1998), Al Jazeera is
probably the closest thing to independent television journalism currently available in Arabic.
While Al Jazeera and CNN are similar in many respects, and are both generally thought to
adhere to high journalistic standards, the viewpoints implicit in their coverage are very diﬀerent.
Al Jazeera has been criticized in the West for taking an anti-American and even a pro-terrorist
stance in its reporting. Its coverage of the Palestinian conﬂict and the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq are said to have strongly emphasized the suﬀering of civilians with limited coverage of the
American or Israeli points of view.13 With regard to the events of September 11, Al Jazeera
has frequently replayed taped messages of Osama bin Laden, reported the charge that Jews were
warned in advance of September 11 not to go to work in the World Trade Center, and broadcast an
interview with a French author who claims the towers were destroyed by US missiles (Campagna,
2001; United Press International, 2002).14 A New York Times critic, after an extended study of the
station’s coverage, wrote: “Al Jazeera... may not oﬃcially be the Osama bin Laden Channel–but
10Thi information was obtained from http://cnnasiapaciﬁc.com/cnni/cnni_corpinfo/cnn/index.asp. September,
2003.
11The viewership ﬁgure is cited in Campagna (2001).
12One author calls the station “a startling new experiment... [that] trumpets its bold independence and provides
a forum for criticisms that otherwise [would] have diﬃculty ﬁnding an outlet” (Alterman 1998). Another writes:
“Al Jazeera has quickly become the most watched—and most controversial—news channel in the region, winning over
viewers with its bold, uncensored news coverage, its unbridled political debates, and its call-in-show formats that
tackle a range of sensitive social, political, and cultural issues” (Campagna 2001).
13See Ajami (2001), Campagna (2001), and Waxman (2001).
14With regard to the claim that Jews were warned not to go to work, a New York Times editorial claims this was
“reported” on Al Jazeera. A station spokesman said a talk show host cited the charge and asked guests to respond
(Campagna 2001).
10he is clearly its star... The channel’s graphics assign him a lead role... A huge, glamorous poster of
bin Laden’s silhouette hangs in the background of the main studio set” (Ajami 2001). At least one
prominent Al Jazeera reporter has been arrested on suspicion of connections to Al Qaeda (Reuters,
2003).
CNN, on the other hand, is frequently seen as giving a pro-Western slant to the news. Like
many US networks, CNN prominently displayed an American ﬂag on its screen for more than a
year after the September 11 attacks. In sharp contrast to the attention given to civilian casualties
on Al Jazeera during the Afghanistan war, a widely cited memo from the chairman of CNN to
his staﬀ suggested that it “seems perverse to focus too much on the casualties or hardship in
Afghanistan” (Kurtz 2001). In terms of the war Iraq, a study of CNN’s coverage found that only
three percent of US guests interviewed expressed opposition to the war, compared to 27 percent
opposition in the American public as a whole (Rendall and Broughel 2003). The coverage of this
w a ro nC N Na n dA lJ a z e e r aw a sa n a l y z e db yaWall Street Journal media critic, who concludes,
“It’s the same conﬂict seen through two diﬀerent lenses. CNN plays up technology and strategy
and 3-D maps analyzed by retired generals. There are few civilians other than embedded reporters.
On Al Jazeera... the conﬂict is messy, bloody and chaotic. Soldiers ﬁre from dusty trenches; injured
children ﬁll hospitals” (Nelson 2003).15
Both networks are freely available to any household with access to a satellite in all sample
countries except Iran, in which satellite television is illegal, and Indonesia, in which the networks
are available only through paid subscription services. The cost of a satellite dish is less than $100,
and dishes are “as common in Cairo slums as they are in Dubai mansions” (Ajami 2001). Many
people who do not have dishes at home watch the channels in public places such as cafes and
restaurants.
Our study of these news networks takes advantage of two questions asked in the Gallup poll:
Which TV channel would you tune ﬁrst nowadays to catch up on current world aﬀairs?
Which other TV channels did you watch at anytime in the past seven days?
15These quotes refer to the domestic broadcast of CNN, and our statistical results pertain to CNN International.
Although the programming and coverage on the two networks are quite similar, they may not be identical in all the
respects mentioned here.
11Respondents were permitted to give any answer they liked; the surveyor did not prompt with a
list of networks. From these two questions we divided respondents into four categories: those who
watched neither CNN nor Al Jazeera in the past seven days, those who watched CNN only, those
who watched Al Jazeera only, and those who watched both CNN and Al Jazeera.
Table 3 shows breakdowns of these four categories by country. The low viewership numbers
in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia are as expected, and those countries are consequently
dropped in this section of the analysis. Overall, both networks are fairly popular, with 7 percent of
all respondents watching both Al Jazeera and CNN in the last seven days, and 62 percent watching
neither network. Dropping Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia, these numbers change to 14
percent watching both and less than 35 percent watching neither network.
Table 4 shows the results of regressions of our knowledge and attitude measures on dummy
variables representing three of our four viewership categories. All speciﬁcations include dummies
for education, gender, age, urban/rural status, marital status, and country of residence, using the
categories shown in Appendix Table 1. The dummy for the “neither” category has been omitted
from the models, so coeﬃcients in these regressions can be interpreted as measuring the attitudes
or knowledge of a particular category relative to respondents who watched neither CNN nor Al
Jazeera in the past seven days. To avoid a confound with total amount of TV watched, we included
only those respondents who indicated that they watch television seven days a week, or about 88
percent of the sample in the included countries.
Turning ﬁrst to our measure of politically neutral knowledge, whether the respondent knows
who Koﬁ Annan is, column (1) shows that those respondents who watch either or both networks
are more likely to know his identity than those who watch neither. The eﬀect of “Al Jazeera only”
is strongly statistically signiﬁcant. Additionally, there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
this measure of knowledge between those watching CNN only and those watching Al Jazeera only,
and those watching both are better informed than those watching either one alone. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the view that, while these two networks spin the news very diﬀerently, they both
provide similar amounts of basic information.
In the case of more politically charged beliefs–the propensity to believe stories that Arabs car-
ried out the September 11 attacks–the picture is quite diﬀerent. Column (2) shows that watchers
12of CNN only are more likely to believe these reports (though the diﬀerence is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant) and Al Jazeera watchers are signiﬁcantly less likely to believe them, relative to those who
watch neither network. Respondents who report watching both networks are slightly less likely
to believe that a group of Arabs carried out the attacks than respondents who watched neither
network.
The diﬀerence between those who watch both networks and those who watch Al Jazeera only
is statistically signiﬁcant, illustrating that the observed relationships are not driven by diﬀerences
between households with and without satellite television. Any household with access to Al Jazeera
also has access to CNN and vice versa, so there is no diﬀerence in satellite access between the “Al
Jazeera only” and “both” categories. Nevertheless, there is a sizable diﬀerence in attitudes.
The contrast between columns (1) and (2) tends to refute the view that exposure to richer
sources of information will lead to a convergence of beliefs. Although watching CNN and watching
Al Jazeera are both associated with a greater likelihood of knowing who Koﬁ Annan is, the two
networks have very diﬀerent associations with beliefs about the perpetrators of the September 11
attacks.
Column (3) shows that there is also a relationship between news network viewership and at-
titudes about September 11. Respondents who watched CNN only were insigniﬁcantly less likely
to say that the attacks on September 11 were completely unjustiﬁable. Al Jazeera watchers were
signiﬁcantly less likely to consider the attacks unjustiﬁable, as were respondents who report having
watched both CNN and Al Jazeera.
The relationship between news network viewing and overall favorability towards the United
States, presented in column (4) of Table 4, reveals that CNN watchers are more favorable toward
the US than Al Jazeera watchers, with watchers of both networks closer to the Al Jazeera only
category than to the CNN only category. (All coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant.)
Overall, the evidence in Table 4 suggests that, although CNN and Al Jazeera convey similar
amounts of basic information, information from the two stations has very diﬀerent eﬀects on at-
titudes. Moreover, the propensity to believe that a group of Arabs carried out the September 11
attacks is strongly associated with the news network(s) watched.
133.3 Language and current events interest
Despite our use of demographic controls, the results in the previous subsection raise concerns
about causality. Most obviously, the relationship between media and attitudes may simply reﬂect
the fact that those with relatively pro-US attitudes are more likely to watch CNN, and those with
relatively anti-US attitudes tend to watch Al Jazeera. Reverse causality is less obviously a problem
in regressions with factual beliefs on the left-hand side, but it is possible that some omitted variables
inﬂuence both media choices and beliefs.
We address these concerns by using cross-country variation in the ability to access the two
networks. The ideal way to deal with the reverse causality issue would be to have a source of
exogenous variation in access at the individual level. However, the ubiquity of satellite access,
combined with the particular limitations of our data set, mean we do not have any instruments that
could function in this way. Using cross-country diﬀerences is a coarser approach, and the results will
be subject to the criticism that they pick up the eﬀect of other country-level diﬀerences unrelated
to media. Keeping these limitations in mind, however, this will be a good check on whether the
eﬀects documented in the media regressions are spurious, or capture a causal relationship.
The speciﬁc country-level diﬀerence we exploit is the extent to which people are able to under-
stand English and Arabic. Since CNN broadcasts only in English (or Turkish in the case of CNN
Turkey), and Al Jazeera only in Arabic, language is a strong constraint on an individual’s ability
to access the networks. Our basic approach is to compare knowledge and attitudes for individuals
categorized along two dimensions: propensity to watch television news (captured by reported at-
tention to current events), and the extent to which English and/or Arabic are widely understood in
the individual’s country. If current events junkies in Arabic-speaking countries diﬀer in knowledge
or attitudes, compared to both those less interested in current events and those following current
events in non-Arabic-speaking countries, we interpret this as an eﬀect of the Arabic-language media
(including Al Jazeera). Similarly, we interpret the interaction between current events interest and
living in a country where English is widely spoken as the eﬀect of access to English-language news,
for which CNN is by far the most important source.
The measure of attention to current aﬀairs comes directly from the survey. Respondents were
14asked:
With respect to how much attention you pay to current aﬀairs, would you say that you
do not pay much attention (code 1),..., pay a lot of attention (code 5).
For ease of interpretation, we have recoded the response to this question to vary from 0 to 1.
The extent to which Arabic is widely understood is also relatively easy to code. In ﬁve of
our countries–Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco–Arabic is the ﬁrst language
and is spoken by virtually everyone. In the remaining four countries–Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and
Indonesia–Arabic is not the ﬁrst language. While it is used to some extent, especially for religious
purposes, the majority of people could not understand a news broadcast in Arabic. We therefore
code the former countries as Arabic-speaking and the latter as not.
Measuring the number of people who understand English is more diﬃcult. English is not the
ﬁrst language in any of the sample countries, and we are unaware of any accurate data on the
fraction of people ﬂuent in it as a second language. Nevertheless, two sources of information
suggest strong diﬀerences among our countries. First, data to be discussed in section 3 show that
English is a common language of university instruction in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan,
and Pakistan. Second, the Linguasphere Register, a classiﬁcation of “the world’s languages and
speech communities,” lists Kuwait, Jordan and Pakistan as countries where English is widely spoken
(Dalby et al. 1999). The latter is consistent with the fact that Kuwait, Jordan, and Pakistan are the
only countries in our sample that were previously under some form of British rule. Since colonial
history seems the clearest way to separate the sample, we will categorize these three as countries
where English is common. However, none of the qualitative results below change if we include
Saudi Arabia and Lebanon as well. Finally, we add Turkey to the “English” category, not because
English is widely spoken but because individuals there have access to broadcasts from CNN Turkey
in their native language.
As a ﬁrst step, we verify that the language categories relate in the predicted way to viewership of
CNN and Al Jazeera. Table 3 shows that the fraction watching Al Jazeera in the Arabic-language
c o u n t r i e si sh i g h ,w h e r e a si ti se s s e n t i a l l yz e r oi n the non-Arabic countries. CNN viewership is
high in Kuwait, Turkey, and Pakistan, signiﬁcant in Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, and
15negligible in the remaining countries, roughly consistent with our categorization. A more accurate
way to test the relationship is to run a regression of viewership on the interaction between the
language variables and attention to current events. Focusing on the interaction removes any eﬀect of
diﬀerences between the country groups in average viewership, such as might be caused by diﬀerences
in education or income. The results of this exercise go in the predicted direction: the interaction
between English and current events has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on CNN viewership, but no
eﬀect on Al Jazeera viewership; the interaction with Arabic has exactly the reverse pattern.
We will estimate models of the form:
Dependent variable = α + β (current events interest)+γ (country)
+λ(Arabic × current events interest)
+ρ(English × current events interest)+ε
and test the hypothesis that λ<0 and ρ>0 for attitudes, but λ>0 and ρ>0 for knowledge.
This approach has the disadvantage relative to the regressions in Table 4 that we will not be able
to identify the precise networks or publications responsible for the eﬀects, but has the advantage
that it will not be contaminated by reverse causality.
The results of this test are shown in Table 5. In general, they validate our hypotheses. Column
(1) demonstrates that both being in an Arabic-speaking country and being in an English-speaking
country make respondents interested in current events relatively more likely to have heard of Koﬁ
Annan. The coeﬃcients on the two key interaction terms are of similar magnitude and are sta-
tistically indistinguishable. This is consistent with the ﬁnding in Table 4 that both CNN and Al
Jazeera provide comparable amounts of information.
As column (2) shows, eﬀects on believing that a group of Arabs carried out the September 11
attacks go in the expected direction, although they are not statistically signiﬁcant. Greater interest
in current events is associated with a lower likelihood of believing that a group of Arabs carried
out the attacks in Arabic-speaking countries (relative to the baseline); the opposite holds for the
interaction with English language.
Column (3) shows that the probability that a respondent believes the September 11 attacks are
16unjustiﬁable rises more rapidly with current events interest in English-language countries, and rises
less rapidly in Arabic-language countries. The former eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant. Column (4)
r e p e a t st h i ss p e c i ﬁcation using general favorability toward the US as a dependent variable, and
ﬁnds similar results. In this case, it is the eﬀect of Arabic-language interacted with current events
interest that is statistically signiﬁcant; the English-language eﬀect is wrong-signed and statistically
insigniﬁcant.
As an additional robustness check, we have run all of the same regressions including interactions
between the language variables and our standard set of demographics. This veriﬁes that the eﬀects
we are picking up are not driven by demographic diﬀerences across countries that happen to be
correlated with language. The results are not shown in Table 5, but the sign and statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients remain the same.
On the whole, then, our hypotheses are conﬁrmed: those interested in current events and living
in Arabic-speaking countries are less likely to attribute the September 11 attacks to Arab terrorists
and tend to be less pro-US in their attitudes; those who follow current aﬀairs and live in relatively
more English-speaking countries are both better informed and more pro-US. The evidence in Table
5 thus serves to strengthen the case made by Table 4 that it is the source of information, not
information itself, which aﬀects misperceptions and attitudes.
3.4 Comparisons with the United States
While recent events have made knowledge, perceptions and attitudes in the Muslim world espe-
cially relevant, some evidence exists to suggest that the patterns we have described in this section
may apply equally well to Americans. A recent poll collected evidence on media use and several
misperceptions from a sample of Americans (Kull et al, 2003). Misperceptions studied related to
evidence of an Iraqi-Al Qaeda link, whether weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq,
and whether Iraq used chemical or biological weapons in the recent war. Tabulations of the survey
data show no consistent relationship between overall attention to the news and the frequency of
misperceptions, but a strong eﬀects when the speciﬁc source of news is taken into account. While
these results are not conclusive, they suggest that the patterns we observe in Islamic countries may
17apply equally to beliefs in the United States.
4E d u c a t i o n
Even more than media, perhaps, the education system plays a critical role in determining the
information available to individuals. We therefore study the eﬀects of educational attainment on
knowledge measures and attitudes toward the US as a second test of our key hypotheses. We predict
that more educated individuals will always be better informed on politically neutral measures, but
will not necessarily have more accurate perceptions of September 11 or be more pro-US in their
attitudes. Moreover, we expect that the heterogeneity in the eﬀects of education on attitudes will
be related to the extent of western inﬂuence in the school system.
The Gallup dataset codes educational attainment into 7 categories, described in Appendix Table
2. We convert these into approximate years of completed schooling, and estimate models of the
form:
Dependent variable = α + β (years of schooling × country)+Xλ+ ε
where X is a set of controls including country dummies and dummies for the demographic charac-
teristics described in Appendix Table 1. Table 6 reports the country-speciﬁc education coeﬃcients
that result from this exercise. Each column reports the estimated marginal eﬀect of education on
the corresponding dependent variable for residents of each country. To improve statistical precision,
we assume that control variables have identical eﬀects in all countries.
By far the most consistent relationship is between schooling and the probability of knowing who
Koﬁ Annan is: this relationship, shown in column (1), is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all
8 countries for which data are available. In all countries, more schooling is strongly associated with
more politically neutral knowledge.
The eﬀect of education on the propensity to believe that a group of Arabs carried out the
September 11 attacks is generally small and positive, although the point estimate is insigniﬁcantly
negative in Indonesia. The coeﬃcients in column (2) are generally much smaller than the corre-
sponding estimates in column (1), indicating that schooling has a much stronger associating with
18knowing who Koﬁ Annan is than with believing that a group of Arabs perpetrated the September
11 attacks. Once again, knowledge about September 11 does not behave like politically neutral
information.
Column (3) reveals signiﬁcant cross-country variation in the relationship between schooling
and attitudes about September 11. Out of the seven countries for which data are available, two
(Kuwait and Pakistan) show a statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship between schooling and
the probability of believing that the September 11 attacks are unjustiﬁable, three (Turkey, Iran,
and Indonesia) show a statistically insigniﬁcant positive eﬀect, one (Lebanon) shows a statistically
insigniﬁcant negative eﬀect, and one (Morocco) a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect.16 There
is similar variability in the relationship between education and general attitudes toward the US, as
s h o w ni nc o l u m n( 4 ) .
What accounts for the diﬀerences in the education eﬀect across countries? One candidate
explanation is that some countries’ education systems place relatively more emphasis on Western
information sources. To explore this hypothesis, we have collected data on the share of universities
conducting regular instruction in English and Arabic for our nine sample countries. These data,
compiled from Awais (1987) and summarized in Table 7, provide a proxy for the extent to which
Western sources of knowledge are used in instruction. An individual residing in a country whose
universities use English as a primary or secondary language ought to have more access to English-
language sources, especially if that individual is herself a university graduate.
This language measure is also broadly correlated with the extent of British or American in-
ﬂuence in the structure of the education system. In the four countries that have the highest
percentage of instruction in English–Pakistan, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Jordan–the major univer-
sities were all either founded directly by the British or American governments, or designed with
extensive participation by British or American consultants.17 In the countries with the lowest Eng-
16In light of these cross-country diﬀerences, it does not seem surprising that Krueger and Maleckova (2003) ﬁnd no
consistent relationship between socioeconomic status and support for terrorism in Palestine.
17The University of Punjab, which controls higher education standards throughout Pakistan, was founded by the
British and modeled on the University of London. Two of the leading Lebanese universities, the American University
of Beirut and Beirut University College, were chartered by the Board of Regents of the State of New York. Kuwait
University was founded following a report by consltants from Cambridge, England, and American University of Beirut
(Altbach 1991). The structure of the University of Jordan was based on a report by a British delegation from Oxford,
19lish percentages–Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, and Morocco–the models were either French, Dutch, or
independently developed.18
Table 8 tests formally whether the eﬀects of university education diﬀer systematically depending
on the country’s typical languages of instruction. Here we parallel Table 5 and estimate models of
the form
Dependent variable = α + β (university education)+γX
+λ(share teaching in English × university education)
+ρ(share teaching in Arabic × university education)+ε
where X is a set of controls including country dummies and dummies for the demographic charac-
teristics described in Appendix Table 1.
Column (1) shows that there are no signiﬁcant interactions between language of instruction and
university education using as a dependent variable whether the respondent knows who Koﬁ Annan
is. Politically neutral information appears equally sensitive to university education in all countries.
Ad i ﬀerent picture emerges in column (2), which shows that the eﬀect of education on the
probability of believing that a group of Arabs carried out the September 11 attacks decreases
signiﬁcantly with the share of universities instructing in Arabic. The university eﬀect increases
with the share instructing in English, but this interaction is not statistically signiﬁcant. Taken
together, the columns (1) and (2) suggests that the speciﬁc characteristics of the education system
captured by the language variable change the information provided about politically charged events,
but do not aﬀect the provision of politically neutral information.
Column (3) shows that the eﬀect of having a university education on the probability of believ-
ing the September 11 attacks are unjustiﬁable is higher in countries with more English-language
instruction, and lower in countries with more Arabic-language instruction. These diﬀerences are
statistically signiﬁcant and large: a change from 0 universities teaching in English to all universities
teaching in English raises the university eﬀect by 20 percentage points.
Cambridge, and the University of London (University of Jordan 2003).
18See Altbach (1991) for Turkey and Indonesia. See Clark and Neave (1992) for Iran and Morocco.
20With respect to general attitudes toward the US, as column (4) shows there is no signiﬁcant
interaction between English instruction and university education, and a marginally signiﬁcant neg-
ative interaction between Arabic instruction and university education.
The pattern of the coeﬃcients remains the same when we add interactions between the language
of instruction variables and our usual set of demographics, though the results are not shown in
the table. This provides some evidence that the eﬀects are not driven by observable diﬀerences
correlated with language that also change the eﬀect of university education on pro-US views.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Our ﬁndings regarding both media and education suggest that increased access to information does
not necessarily lead beliefs to converge to the truth. Instead, particular news outlets and educa-
tion systems appear able to manipulate politically charged beliefs, and may actually exacerbate
misinformation. Diﬀerent information sources are also closely tied to both expressed support for
terrorist activities and general attitudes toward the West.
People in the United States and the Islamic world are clearly, to use Lippmann’s (1922) for-
mulation, thinking and feeling in diﬀerent worlds. The severe consequences of such divergent
perceptions seem clear. More than anything else, the results above point to the crucial role of
information providers in shaping these perceptions, and suggest that understanding better the con-
straints and incentives that govern the market for politically relevant information–news, persua-
sion, propaganda–is a crucial task for future research. We are optimistic based on recent advances
in the literature that economics is now well positioned to make progress on this front.
In terms of more immediate policy issues, the results suggest that exposure to a broader range
of information sources could reduce hostility on both sides of the current conﬂict. From the US
perspective, a simple intervention would be to encourage the growth of Western media in Muslim
countries. This could include subsidizing broadcasts of Western news sources in Arabic, and other
local languages of the Muslim world. Such eﬀorts could be applied to CNN, as well as other
networks such as the BBC or FOX that are not freely available in the Middle East at the present
21time.19 This proposal has been advanced, for example, in a recent Washington Post opinion piece
(Satloﬀ, 2003). A more controversial approach is for the government to sponsor the production
and broadcast of original programming with a pro-American message. For example, government
oﬃcials have recently called for the establishment of a “Middle East Television Network,” broadcast
in Arabic throughout the Middle East, that would replicate the popularity of the recently launched
Radio Sawa (Shelby, 2003). How the eﬀects of such explicitly persuasive messages would diﬀer from
the subtler “spin” introduced by newscasts is a question outside the scope of this study, and an
important topic for further research.
19As pointed out by Mullainathan and Shleifer (2003), the equilibrium eﬀect of increasing the supply of Western
n e w sw o u l dd e p e n do nt h ee x i s t i n gn e w ssources reposition their coverage in response. For example, if Al Jazeera
were to adopt a more anti-US stance in order to further diﬀerentiate itself from new Western sources, introducing
more such sources could actually increase the degree of anti-US sentiment.
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25Table 1: Summary of key variables
Know who Believe stories 9/11 attacks General attitude
Koﬁ Annan is about 9/11 unjustiﬁable toward US
(%) (%) (%) (Avg.)
Lebanon 96.0 42.4 62.4 0.474
Kuwait 96.5 11.1 25.7 0.438
Saudi Arabia NA NA NA 0.275
Jordan 94.6 NA NA 0.295
Turkey 37.8 51.5 55.6 0.492
Pakistan 53.0 4.1 40.9 0.202
Iran 60.4 20.3 55.8 0.224
Morocco 63.5 12.8 54.5 0.398
Indonesia 88.9 21.6 74.3 0.491
Total 69.9 21.5 52.3 0.346
Notes:
Individuals with missing data have been omitted from the table. Results are weighted as recommended
by the data providers.
26Table 2: Eﬀects of media use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Know who Believe stories 9/11 attacks General attitude
Koﬁ Annan is about 9/11 unjustiﬁable toward US
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS
Newspaper 0.0275 0.0017 0.0053 -0.0007
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0015)
Television 0.0190 0.0056 0.0041 -0.0038
(0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0019)
Radio 0.0098 0.0018 -0.0035 0.0021
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0013)
N 9203 7583 8102 9607
Notes:
Individuals with missing data on dependent variable or key independent variable have been omitted from
the table. Results are weighted as recommended by the data providers. All speciﬁcations include dummies
for education, gender, age, urban/rural status, marital status, and country of residence, using the categories
shown in Appendix Table 1. In probit speciﬁcations, coeﬃcients reported reﬂect marginal eﬀects.
27Table 3: News network viewership by country
Neither CNN Al Jazeera Both
(%) Only (%) Only (%) (%)
Lebanon 36.88 5.1 46.25 11.77
Kuwait 7.87 2.58 46.49 43.06
Saudi Arabia 18.08 1.16 68.82 11.94
Jordan 39.38 1.08 52.69 6.85
Turkey 77.97 22.03 0 0
Pakistan 78.04 21.96 0 0
Iran 99.01 0 0.99 0
Morocco 61.56 0.24 36.57 1.63
Indonesia 99.39 0.61 0 0
Total 61.94 6.52 24.45 7.09
Notes:
Individuals with missing data have been omitted from the table. Results are weighted as recommended
by the data providers.
28Table 4: Eﬀects of news source
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Know who Believe stories 9/11 attacks General attitude
Koﬁ Annan is about 9/11 unjustiﬁable toward US
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS
CNN only 0.0296 0.0653 -0.0142 0.0827
(0.0200) (0.0567) (0.0679) (0.0365)
Al Jazeera 0.0390 -0.0822 -0.0935 -0.0449
only (0.0098) (0.0206) (0.0271) (0.0136)
Both CNN & 0.0544 -0.0172 -0.1729 -0.0802
Al Jazeera (0.0090) (0.0290) (0.0355) (0.0197)
N 3269 2457 2450 3769
Notes:
Individuals with missing data on dependent variable or key independent variables have been omitted
from the table. Results are weighted as recommended by the data providers. Results exclude respondents
living in Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia or Iran and watching television fewer than seven days a week. All
speciﬁcations include dummies for education, gender, age, urban/rural status, marital status, and country
of residence, using the categories shown in Appendix Table 1. In probit speciﬁcations, coeﬃcients reported
reﬂect marginal eﬀects.
29Table 5: Language, knowledge and attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Know who Believe stories 9/11 attacks General attitude
Koﬁ Annan is about 9/11 unjustiﬁable toward US
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS
English × 0.3175 0.0040 0.1741 -0.0531
Current events (0.1759) (0.0222) (0.0695) (0.0508)
Arabic × 0.3822 -0.0814 -0.0330 -0.1450
Current events (0.1044) (0.0518) (0.0818) (0.0523)
Current events -0.1012 0.0515 -0.0477 0.0034
(0.0888) (0.0139) (0.0571) (0.0313)
N 7873 6362 6821 8338
Notes:
Individuals with missing data on dependent variable or key independent variable have been omitted from
the table. Results are weighted as recommended by the data providers. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by country to correct for intercorrelation among the error terms. All speciﬁcations include controls
for country of residence. In probit speciﬁcations, coeﬃcients reported reﬂect marginal eﬀects.
30Table 6: Education eﬀects by country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Know who Believe stories 9/11 attacks General attitude
Koﬁ Annan is about 9/11 unjustiﬁable toward US
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS
Lebanon 0.0772 0.0353 -0.0050 0.0072
(0.0199) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0027)
Kuwait 0.0499 0.0295 0.0434 0.0163
(0.0209) (0.0192) (0.0148) (0.0030)
Saudi Arabia NA NA NA -0.0003
(0.0035)
Jordan 0.0954 NA NA 0.0100
(0.0181) (0.0028)
Turkey 0.1190 0.0125 0.0101 0.0042
(0.0137) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0021)
Pakistan 0.1262 0.0337 0.0499 -0.0039
(0.0113) (0.0177) (0.0086) (0.0017)
Iran 0.1506 0.0271 0.0020 0.0174
(0.0085) (0.0100) (0.0072) (0.0016)
Morocco 0.1961 0.0289 -0.0356 -0.0030
(0.0182) (0.0115) (0.0096) (0.0022)
Indonesia 0.1473 -0.0165 0.0115 -0.0060
(0.0220) (0.0231) (0.0211) (0.0039)
N 9203 7583 8102 9607
Notes:
Individuals with missing data on dependent variables or education have been omitted from the table.
Results are weighted as recommended by the data providers. All speciﬁcations include dummies for gender,
age, urban/rural status, marital status, and country of residence, using the categories shown in Appendix
Table 1. Coeﬃcients on controls are restricted to be identical across countries. In probit speciﬁcations,
coeﬃcients reported reﬂect marginal eﬀects.
31Table 7: Share of universities instructing in English
Country No. of Universities Pct. Instructing in
Reporting Language English Arabic
Lebanon 5 80 80
Kuwait 1 100 100
Saudi Arabia 8 75 100
Jordan 3 100 100
Turkey 18 11 0
Pakistan 18 100 0
Iran 14 21 0
Morocco 3 33 100
Indonesia 29 17 3
Total 99 43 20
Notes:
Table is based on authors’ calculations from Awais (1987).
32Table 8: Language and university education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Know who Believe stories 9/11 attacks General attitude
Koﬁ Annan is about 9/11 unjustiﬁable toward US
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS
English share × 0.0174 0.0542 0.2152 -0.0252
University (0.0860) (0.0477) (0.0288) (0.0769)
Arabic share × -0.0438 -0.0820 -0.1467 -0.1022
University (0.1075) (0.0392) (0.0238) (0.0551)
University 0.1767 0.0578 0.0074 0.1178
education (0.0182) (0.0306) (0.0313) (0.0555)
N 9203 7583 8102 9607
Notes:
Individuals with missing data on dependent variable or key independent variable have been omitted
from the table. Results are weighted as recommended by the data providers. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by country to correct for intercorrelation among the error terms. All speciﬁcations include
dummies for gender, age, urban/rural status, marital status, and country of residence, using the categories
shown in Appendix Table 1. In probit speciﬁcations, coeﬃcients reported reﬂect marginal eﬀects.
33Appendix Table 1: Demographic characteristics
Share (%) Share (%)
Age (years) Urban/rural status
Missing 0.1 Missing 0.3
18-19 9.3 Urban 53.4
20-24 17.3 Suburban 18.2
25-29 15.4 Rural 28.2
30-34 14.5
35-39 12.6 Gender
40-44 9.7 Male 50.4
45-49 7.3 Female 49.6
50-54 5.2
55-59 3.4 Marital status
60+ 5.4 Single 32.3
Married with children 59.8
Schooling Married w/o children 6.4





Shares may not add to 100% due to rounding. Results are weighted as recommended by the data
providers.
34Appendix Table 2: Education codes




1 Do not have any formal education 0
2 S o m ee l e m e n t a r ye d u c a t i o n / c a nr e a da n dw r i t e 3
3 Finished elementary ed. less than intermediate 6
4 Finished intermediate less than secondary 9
5 Finished secondary 12
6 College some university 14
7 University and above 16
35